Ross Poole
In recent years, a number of theorists -I will focus on Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2006) , but see also Jeffrey C. Alexander (2002) and Helmut Dubiel (2003) 1 -have argued for what I will call the 'universalization scenario' about the memory of the Holocaust. This scenario has two aspects. The first is that the Holocaust has come to function not merely as a name for a specific historical crime, but as a universal signifier for the systematic violation of human rights in general. It has been 'transformed into a generalized symbol of human suffering and moral evil' (Alexander 2002, p. 6), denoting 'moral evil itself ' (Dubiel 2003, p. 59) . At the same time, and this is the second aspect of the scenario, the memory of the Holocaust has ceased to be the particular possession of the members of those states and groups which were directly involved in the Holocaust, but has become universalized in the sense that it has become the common property of everyone (or at least of everyone in what the authors call 'Second Modernity'). As Levy and Sznaider occasionally recognize, there are two concepts of universality at work here. The first is the conceptual and normative universality of a concept that applies to a potentially infinite number of instances; the second is geographical, or perhaps political: it refers to the spread of a cultural symbol across state boundaries. The universalization scenario argues for the conjunction of these two concepts. As the Holocaust has become a (conceptually/normatively) universal signifier in a (geographically/politically) universal memory, it directs the bearers of that memory not merely toward an awareness of a specific past horror, but toward the recognition and prevention of present and future ones. In this way, the Holocaust has come to play a crucial role in contemporary human rights practice, and is even becoming a 'potential symbol of global solidarity' (Levy and Sznaider 2006, p. 54 ).
I will suggest that there are good reasons to be skeptical of this optimistic scenario. I will argue in the first section that what I call the normative status of memory depends on a much stronger connection between specific events and particular subjects than anything allowed for in this scenario. In the second and third sections I will suggest that the Holocaust, as it is currently remembered, has little universal significance. To the extent that the Holocaust has become a free-floating signifier of suffering and evil, this has more to do with moral selfindulgence than human rights. Where it has become associated with particular national projects, it has normative content but this is directed toward specific political agendas, not toward human rights (and especially not toward the rights of those in the way of these agendas). The proviso 'as it is currently remembered' is important. It is not my intention to deny the universal significance of the Holocaust; indeed, part of my objection to the 'universalization' scenario is that it distorts and trivializes that significance. In the fourth section I will suggest that the concept of a crime against humanity is a better route to understanding the universal significance of the Holocaust than anything provided by the 'universalization scenario.' I Memory has force. It is not merely the conduit of information (and misinformation) about the past; it is also -and primarily -the medium through which the past makes demands on us. These demands are not the abstract deliverances of reason or of universal moral law; they speak to us of episodes in our history to which we now have to respond. The voice of memory is our voice, and its demands are addressed to us. We hear its voice and recognize its authority. It is because of the force of memory that it is of concern, not just to academic theorists seeking publication, but to political leaders, publicists and activists, keen to mobilize action in the real world. It is also why disputes over memory are carried on with such intensity and vehemence: the participants recognize that memory counts.
Each of us has their own individual memory. The key form of individual memory is what psychologists call 'episodic memory,' that is, the memory that we have of specific events in our personal past. It may be that this kind of memory is unique to the human species. In any
